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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stages of pregnancy, then this experience would be a strong empirical
basis for establishing a maternity leave policy. If no problems arose,
then no leave policy would be necessary.
Notwithstanding what Title VII or the equal protection clause
might require, the best approach to maternity leave problems is that
expressed by a Mooresville, North Carolina, junior high school princi-
pal: "Why should I lose a good teacher just because she's pregnant?"'' 0
GEORGE R. HODGES
Products Liability-Liability of the Bailor for Hire for Personal Injuries
Caused by Defective Goods
One of the advantages enjoyed by the modern consumer is the
ability to rent almost any item he desires. The rental business is rapidly
and ever-increasingly becoming a major feature of the American econ-
omy. Not only can the consumer "let Hertz put him in the driver's seat"
of a new automobile, he can rent wheel chairs, ladders, lawn mowers,
golf carts, and a myriad of other products.
The legal relationship created by the rental of a chattel has been
called a bailment for hire,1 a lease, 2 and a bailment for mutual benefit.3
The transaction differs from -a sale in that although the bailee has pos-
session of the goods, title remains in the bailor and the bailee is obliged
to surrender possession to the bailor at the end of the bailment term.
Although some courts seem to categorize longer and more formal ar-
rangements as leases rather than as bailmentsl the legal consequences
'1Charlotte Observer, Sept. 28, 1972, at 20A, col. 1.
'E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777-
78 (1965); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2 (1962 Official Text) [hereinafter
cited as UCC]; Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L.
REv. 653, 655 (1957). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 179 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 781
(1965). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) which recognizes only leases
of real property.
3E.g., Global Tank Trailer Sales v. Textilana-Nease, Inc., 209 Kan. 314, 496 P.2d 1292
(1972); Brown v. Hudson, 50 Tenn. App. 658, 667, 363 S.W.2d 505, 509 (1962); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 179 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
'Compare W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970)
with Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777-78
(1965).
[Vol. 51
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of these characterizations do not differ, so all types of rental arrange-
ments will be treated similarly in this comment.
All too frequently, rented chattels prove to be defective for reasons
of faulty manufacturing or failure by the bailor to keep the goods in a
safe condition. When these defects cause personal injuries, the legal
system must determine an equitable compensation for the injured party.
Sometimes the cause of justice is served best by shifting the loss to the
bailor, and at other times, by leaving the loss on the bailee.5 In North
Carolina, as in most states, the liability of the bailor has been measured
by the negligence doctrine.' A few states have also recognized a
common-law implied warranty arising from the transaction.7 More re-
cently, some courts have found an implied warranty by using the sales
article of the Uniform Commercial Code as a source of law to be
applied to the lease and bailment in both commercial and personal
injury litigation.' Another recent trend is the application of theories of
strict liability in tort to bailments? This comment will examine the
application of these three theories of liability-negligence, warranty,
and strict liability in tort-to the bailment for hire and will analyze them
in an attempt to discover whether any one of the theories is more
advantageous to either the plaintiff or society.
NEGLIGENCE
In a bailment for hire the law imposes on the bailor the duty to
exercise the care of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence to see that
the goods do no harm to the bailee. 10 Although the bailor is not an
insurer of the safety and quality of goods rented, he will be held liable
for personal injuries to the bailee or third persons proximately resulting
from the defective condition of the rented chattel if he was aware of the
defective condition or by reasonable care and inspection could have
discovered it." In most states a breach of this duty of reasonable care
5See Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REv. 886
(1967).
'See text following note 9 infra.
7See text following note 33 infra.
'See text following note 48 infra.
9See text following note 80 infra.
"xW. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 677 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. The duty of a gratuitous bailor is discussed in note 33 infra.
"Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 505, 73 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1952); Brown v.
Hudson, 50 Tenn. App. 658, 667-68, 363 S.W.2d 505, 509 (1962); PROSSER § 104, at 676-77.
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gives rise to a negligence action. 2 In a few states, however, this same
duty to use reasonable care to inspect the chattel for defects is erro-
neously called an implied warranty of fitness.13
A recent North Carolina case illustrates the bailor's duty to warn
of known defects." The plaintiff was injured after the brakes on his
rented golf car failed to hold, and the cart rolled backward down a steep
hill and overturned. Testimony of the golf course professional estab-
lished that although he knew that the cart's brakes could not prevent
the cart from rolling backwards, he did not consider this unusual and
therefore did not warn the plaintiff.' 5 The court held this to be actionable
negligence because knowledge of the defective condition, even though
its significance is not appreciated by the bailor, imposes a duty on the
bailor to warn the bailee.6 Once the defect has been disclosed to the
bailee, however, the bailor is relieved of any responsibility. 7 Similarly,
there is no duty to warn the bailee if the defect should be obvious to
the user.'
Apart from the duty to warn of known defects, the bailor must use
reasonable care to discover any defects which make the chattel unsafe
to the bailee. t9 Although the standard is only that of reasonable care,
where the nature of the chattel rented, as in the case of an automobile,
makes it more likely that defects will lead to serious injury, more than
a casual inspection is required."0 However, the plaintiff must be able to
12PROSSER § 104, at 676.
3Global Tank Trailer Sales v. Textilana-Nease, Inc., 209 Kan. 314, 496 P.2d 1292 (1972).
See also Yale & Towne, Inc. v. Sharpe, 118 Ga. App. 480, 485, 164 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1968), which
discusses GA. CODE ANN. § 12-204 (1936) requiring the bailor to "warrant" that the chattel bailed
is free from any secret defects rendering it unsuitable for the purpose for which it was hired. The
duty required of the bailor is not that imposed by a true implied warranty, but is only that of use
of ordinary care to ascertain the presence of hidden defects. England v. United States, 405 F.2d
862, 863 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park, 281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d 721
(1972).
"See id. at 55, 187 S.E.2d at 724.
"Id. at 59, 187 S.E.2d at 727; PROSSER § 104, at 676.
"
7Brown v. Hudson, 50 Tenn. App. 658, 669, 363 S.W.2d 505, 509 (1962); PROSSER § 104, at
677.
"Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co., 79 Nev. 441, 386 P.2d 396 (1963) (no duty to warn of the
danger of an open universal joint of a rented posthole digger); Villanueva v. Nowlin, 77 N.M. 174,
420 P.2d 764 (1966).
"Authorities cited note 11 supra.
2"PRoSSER § 95, at 633.
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prove that the defect which caused his injury could have been discovered
by reasonable inspection at the time of rental. 21
The burden of proof is great in a negligence case of this type. The
plaintiff must be able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the proximate cause of his injury was the bailor's negligence.2 2 It is
normally no problem to establish that the defect was the proximate
cause of the accident and the injury, but to connect the defect with the
bailor in such a way as to show a breach of duty is frequently difficult.23
Although direct evidence can be used to show the bailor's negligence, 24
the bailee usually must rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.25 If
the plaintiff can show that the circumstances of the occurrence that
produced the injury permit a reasonable inference that the bailor was
negligent, he can avoid a directed verdict and get his case to the jury.26
Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur normally requires that
the instrumentality causing the injury be in the exclusive control of the
defendant,2 under the majority rule the exclusive-control requirement
does not bar use of the doctrine in a bailment case. 21 Once the bailee
introduces evidence showing that the chattel was not improperly han-
dled or used and that the time of his possession was short enough that
it was not probable that the defect arose during his possession, he should
be permitted to invoke the doctrine .2  The use of res ipsa loquitur in
bailment cases in North Carolina is severely circumscribed, however, by
strict adherence to the doctrine of exclusive control.2 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has rejected use of res ipsa loquitur to show the
"
1Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 505, 73 S.E.2d 4, 5-6 (1952); Stephens v.
Southern Oil Co., 259 N.C. 456, 459, 131 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1963) (violation of safety statute held to
operate to hold owner liable only where he has been negligent in failing to keep brakes in functional
condition).
"Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 505, 73 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1952); PROSSER § 103,
at 672.
'See PROSSER § 103, at 672-73.
2 See Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park, 281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d
721 (1972) (plaintiff was able to establish by defendant's testimony that defendant had knowledge
of the defect).
"PROSSER § 103, at 672. See generally Byrd, Proof of Negligence in North Carolina: Part L
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 48 N.C.L. REv. 452 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Byrd].
2'Byrd 452, 454-55.
"Jd. at 466.
'See PROSSER § 39, at 220-21.
"See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 183, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964);
Byrd 467.
"
0See generally Byrd 466-70.
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bailor's negligence in several automobile brake-failure cases,31 includ-
ing one in which the bailee had driven the car only forty-five minutes
and five and one-half miles before the brakes failed. 2 The court's
objection to its use in this instance apparently was the feeling that any
defect that would have been discoverable by inspection would have man-
ifested itself almost immediately. When the duty of reasonable inspec-
tion is thus discharged by the mechanic's observation that the brakes
stopped the car when he brought it out for the bailee, that duty appears
to have merged into the duty to warn of defects known by the bailor to
exist. Such a restrictive approach to the use of res ipsa loquitur prevents
recovery except where the plaintiff can prove knowledge by the bailor
of the defect and, in effect, changes the substantive law on the duty owed
by the bailor for hire. Thus because of the debilitating restrictions on
the use of res ipsa loquitur in North Carolina, the duty owed in the
bailment for hire in many cases is no greater than in a gratuitous bail-
ment.3
IMPLIED WARRANTY
As the common law of sales developed, sellers of goods were bound
not only by their express warranties, but also by warranties implied by
law. 4 The law has placed on the seller the obligation to guarantee the
quality and safe condition of the goods." This obligation has not been
restricted to sellers, however, for a few courts have recognized that a
common law bailment for hire also gives rise to the same implied war-
ranties of quality on the part of the bailor.36 The first American deci-
"
1Wilcox v. Glover Motors, Inc., 269 N.C. 473, 153 S.E.2d 76 (1967); Hudson v. Drive It
Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 73 S.E.2d 4 (1952).
"2Compare Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 73 S.E.2d 4 (1952), with M.
Dietz & Sons v. Miller, 43 N.J. Super. 334, 339, 128 A.2d 719, 720 (1957) (brake failure only 50
miles after repair allows inference of negligence).
One possible alternative for the plaintiff in the brake failure case is to use violation of a safety
statute (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-124 (1965)) to make out a per se case of negligence. Although the
bailor would be allowed to escape liability if he could convince the jury that the defect was not
discoverable upon proper inspection, the case would at least get to the jury. See Stephens v.
Southern Oil Co., 259 N.C. 456, 460-61, 131 S.E.2d 39, 42-43 (1963).
'3The gratuitous bailor is under the duty only to warn the bailee of defects in the chattel of
which he has knowledge; he is under no duty to inspect. Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 216 Ore.
567, 570-71, 340 P.2d 181, 183 (1959); PROSSER § 95, at 634, § 104, at 677.
"PRossER § 95, at 636.
Ad.
"Id. at 638.
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sion which recognized the implied warranty in a bailment for hire was
the New York case of Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart." This deci-
sion, based on English common law precedent, held that when the bailor
knows, or should know, of the purpose for which the chattel is rented,
there arises an implied warranty that the chattel is "'as fit and suitable
for that purpose as reasonable care and skill can make it.' ",38 Cases
such as Hoisting, which involved the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose,39 normally arise in a commercial context and rarely
involve personal injuries."
The other major implied warranty of quality is a warranty that the
goods are of merchantable quality-that is, that the goods are of a
quality acceptable without objection in the trade and that they are "fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."4 I This is the
implied warranty that is normally involved in bailment cases in which
the bailee is seeking damages for personal injuries caused by the defec-
tive rented goods.
Those courts finding a common law implied warranty of quality
applicable to the bailment for hire rarely have disclosed any reasons why
such transactions should be treated like sales for this purpose. Hoisting
merely stated that such warranties were implied in bailments at com-
mon law,42 and many cases since then which have found a common law
warranty have relied entirely on Hoisting.3 Several of the more recent
cases, however, have attempted to explain why implied warranties
should be held to exist in bailments by showing the analogy of such a
transaction to the sale of chattels.
Several courts have noted that in most rental situations the bailee
relies on the competence and expertise of the bailor to a greater extent
than a buyer relies on the seller." For most commodities there are fewer
37237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923).
"AId. at 37, 142 N.E. at 344.
"See UCC § 2-315; PROSSER § 95, at 636. See generally Corman, Implied Sales Warranty
of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 219.
41For a sales case where personal injuries did result from breach of an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, see Stonebrink v. Highland Motors, Inc., 171 Ore. 415, 137 P.2d
986 (1943).
41UCC § 2-314; see I S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 227 (rev. 6d. 1948); Prosser, The Implied Warranty
of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
41237 N.Y. at 37, 142 N.E.at 344.
43E.g., Hatten Mach. Co. v. Bruch, 59 Wash. 2d 757, 761, 370 P.2d 600, 602 (1962).
"W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 777, 781 (1965).
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potential bailors than sellers. Moreover, the bailee will spend less time
comparing goods than he would were he considering a purchase, which
often may be a considerable investment." In both types of transactions
the merchant, whether seller or bailor, is in a much better position than
the consumer to know and control the condition of the chattel trans-
ferred." It has also been recognized that the bailor, as well as the seller,
is better able to sustain or distribute as a cost of doing business the
expense of insuring against personal injuries caused by defective goods."
One court summed up a discussion of these issues by saying that
"[p]ublic policy demands that in this day of expanding rental and leas-
ing enterprises the consumer who leases be given protection equivalent
to the consumer who purchases."4
Now that almost every American jurisdiction has enacted the Uni-
form Commercial Code, sales of goods by merchants give rise to im-
plied warranties of quality unless an effective disclaimer is made.4" Arti-
cle two, a comprehensive act dealing with sales of goods, contains the
provisions governing sales warranties. Although almost all commenta-
tors agree that article two was intended to be, and by express language
is, limited to transactions involving the sale of goods,"0 it is playing an
ever-increasing role in shaping the law of bailment.
Commentators have frequently urged that article two be used in
non-sales cases by way of analogy.51 Professor Nordstrom, a leading
15W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
"Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 455, 212 A.2d 769, 775,
780 (1965).
11W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d 769, 775 (1965).
4
sW.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
IUCC §§ 2-313 to -315.
• 1C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2.4A, at 30 (1964); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 21, at 41
(1970); Minish, The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota: Articles 2 and 6-Sales and Bulk
Transfers, 50 MINN. L. REV. 103, 104 (1965).
UCC § 2-102, the scope section of article 2, says: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this
Article applies to transactions in goods ...." However, the warranty sections of the article,
UCC §§ 2-312 to -318, are worded to cover only sales.
"Il W. WILLIER & F. HART, FORMS & PROCEDURES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 12.02, at 1-64 (1971); Farnsworth, supra note 1; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 453 (1971); Comment,
The Extention of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 127
(1968); Comment, Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases, 1969
WASH. U.L.Q. 90.
Four ways may be conceived of in which courts in such a legal system as ours might
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commentator on the law of sales, thinks that the judicial approach in
non-sales cases should be to "search for the reasons why the legislature
thought that warranties should be attached to a sale, and determine
whether similar reasons exist for implying a warranty in the non-sales
transaction. If it finds the reasons to be similar, the Code ought to be
used to shape the rights and duties of the parties to the non-sales trans-
action."5" The commentators are not all agreed, however, on exactly
how the Uniform Commercial Code should be used once the analogy
has been drawn.
One commentator advocated the position that all chattel leases
analogous to sales should be governed directly by applicable sections of
article two.53 The recent Arkansas case of Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp.,54 although not involving a personal injury,5 best illustrates the
juducial use of this approach. In that case the lessor of an ice machine
was suing the lessee for failure to make the monthly payments. The
lessee said that since the machine did not operate efficiently in cold
weather, the lessor had breached the implied warranty of fitness. The
lessor maintained that since the lease contained a disclaimer of warran-
ties the lessee had no defense on breach of warranty grounds." The court
held that section 2-316(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code was "appl-
deal with a legislative innovation. (I) They might receive it fully into the body of the
law as affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and
hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the general will, of superior authority
to judge-made rules on the same general subject; and so reason by analogy in preference
to them. (2) They might receive it fully into the body of the law to be reasoned from by
analogy the same as any other rule of law, regarding it, however, as of equal or co-
ordinate authority in this respect with judge-made rules upon the same general sub-
ject. . . . But it is submitted that the course of legal development upon which we have
entered already must lead us to adopt the method of the second and eventually the
method of the first hypothesis.
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1908).
52R. NORDSTROM, supra note 50, § 21, at 43-44.
51Murray, supra note 51, at 453. This is not to be confused with a determination that a
transaction, although called a lease by the parties involved, is really a conditional sales contract,
with title passing to the "lessee" upon payment of an additional nominal sum at the end of the
rental period.
11244 Ark, 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
s'Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671 (D. Md. 1967), is an example of the use of the Code
in a personal injury case. The court seemed to assume that the Code created implied warranties in
a bailment for hire, but refused to let the administratrix in the wrongful death action sue for breach
of warranty because of lack of privity.
5
""No warranties or representations regarding the items herein leased of their condition,
quality or suitability, or their freedom from latent defects, have been made. ... 244 Ark. at
944, 428 S.W.2d at 47-48.
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icable to leases where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a
sale. ' 5 7 Since the disclaimer did not comply with the section 2-316(2)
requirement that to exclude the implied warranty of fitness any written
disclaimer must be conspicuous, the disclaimer was held ineffective."8 A
dissenting opinion argued for application of common-law implied war-
ranties under which the disclaimer would have been equally effective.
The dissent noted that many sections of the Code are clearly not applic-
able to leases and that it would be difficult to determine when lease
provisions made the rental transaction analogous to a sale.59 Although
these arguments have some validity, even the dissenting opinion missed
the real point. As Maryland's highest court recognized when it held that
the Code warranty provisions are clearly limited to sales of goods, "if
the draftsmen had intended the sections to apply to leases of goods as
well as to sales, they should have said so.""o This position is strengthened
by the Official Comment to section 2-313 of the Code, which states:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to
warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for
sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way
to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties . . . .may arise in other appropriate circumstances such
as in the case of bailments for hire. ... Beyond that, the matter is
left to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may
offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.6
A rejection of the direct application of article two does not mean,
therefore, that no use can be made of the Code in bailment transactions.
Passage of the Uniform Commercial Code is an expression of legislative
intent to which the judiciary should look for guidance. It is at least
arguable that the policies of article two, rather than the specific provi-
sions, should be applied to the legal relations of consumers and busi-
nesses in those non-sales transactions analogous to sales. This approach
should prove extremely effective with the Uniform Commercial Code,
for the draftsmen have disclosed the policies of the Code in certain
"Id. at 957, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
mId. at 958, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
5Id. at 959, 428 S.W.2d at 55 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). Justice Fogleman thought that
sections 2-701 to -725 could not be applied to leases without problems arising. See KLPR TV,
Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 326-27 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (UCC §§ 2-714(2),
-715 used to compute damages for breach of implied warranties in a lease).
60Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 73, 285 A.2d 607, 609 (1972).
"1UCC § 2-313, Comment 2 (emphasis added).
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broadly phrased sections of the statute itselfW2 and in the Official Com-
ments to the Act.63
The fact that parties to a non-sales transaction have not met the letter
of the sales provisions of the UCC should not give courts cause to
declare the agreement a nullity if the parties have conducted their
business in a manner which serves the policies as well. Certainly an
extension of common law based on an expression of legislative intent
is preferable to inclusion by judicial legislation."
This application of the Code might best be explained by the use of
several examples. Section 2-314 says that implied warranties apply only
to "merchants," as defined in section 2-104(1). These sections taken
together disclose the Code policy that only those persons whose business
it is to supply goods of the type sold or leased should be bound by
implied warranties of quality. The same test could be used in regard to
bailment cases to determine those transactions where implied warranties
arise. If the bailor tried to disclaim implied warranties of merchantabil-
ity, this method of using the Code would dictate looking to the dis-
claimer section only to discover the legislative policy behind that provi-
sion. Therefore in deciding the disclaimer issue, the court should only
ask whether the Code policy of insuring that the buyer was aware of the
disclaimer and its effect had been satisfied in the bailment case, not
whether the writing mentioned the word "merchantability," as is re-
quired by the section in sales cases.6 5
The recent case of Baker v. City of Seattle" is a rare example of
this type of judicial reasoning. The plaintiff was injured in an accident
when the brakes on his rented golf cart failed. The disclaimer which the
bailor offered in defense to the warranty action had been hidden in the
middle of the one long paragraph of the rental agreement in the same
size print as in the rest of the agreement.17 Citing sections 2-316(2) and
2-719(1) and (3), the court stated:
62E.g., UCC § 2-302.
6E.g., UCC §§ 2-318, Comment 2; UCC § 2-719, Comment 1. The importance of the Offi-
cial Comments will vary among state courts, for not all states adopted them.
'Comment, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 51, at 96. See also Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69,
74, 285 A.2d 607, 609 (1972), which expresses much the same attitude, but goes even further in
refusing to apply the Code by analogy.
-UCC § 2-316(2).
1179 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
71d. at 199, 484 P.2d at 405-06.
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The legislature of this state has announced a public policy with
regard to disclaimers of liability in commercial transactions by enact-
ing the Uniform Commercial Code. . . .To allow the bailor to com-
pletely exclude himself from liability by such an inconspicuous dis-
claimer, would truly be unconscionable."
This approach would appear to be preferable to direct application of
article two of the Uniform Commercial Code because the provisions
were not designed to govern rental transactions.
Once the existence of the implied warranties of quality in a bail-
ment for hire have been established, under the common law or by anal-
ogy to the Uniform Commercial Code, the bailee must prove that there
has been a breach of the implied warranty. Specifically, the bailee must
prove (1) that he was injured, (2) that the injury occurred because the
rented chattel was defective or unreasonably unsafe, and (3) that the
defect existed when the chattel left the hands of the bailor. 9 In other
words, "breach of warranty gives rise to strict liability, which does not
depend upon any knowledge of defects on the part of the seller or bailor,
or any negligence. ' 70 An action based on breach of implied warranty
simply removes from the case the question of negligence and with it any
evidence of due care on the part of the bailor.
The bailor, under this form of strict liability, is normally held to
warrant that as of the time the goods leave his control they contain no
defects.7' There is one case, however, that has held that the implied
warranties of quality extend to insure against any defects that may arise
at any time during the rental period.72 The holding is apparently based
on the premise that since the bailor is making a profit on the rental of
the chattel over the entire span of the rental period, he should bear any
losses caused by a defect in the goods. Although the bailor has the
ability to restrict the rental period to insure that the goods are not in
use beyond their normal useful lives, he could not always withdraw
goods from inventory before defects manifested themselves. Adoption
of this measure of liability practically ensures the injured bailee of
68Id. at 201-02, 484 P.2d at 407.
"PROSSER § 103, at 671-72; see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 50, § 63, at 199.
7
"PROSSER § 95, at 636.7
'See id. § 103, at 671-72.
"Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 450-51, 212 A.2d 769, 778-
79 (1965). Although the lease required the bailor to keep the trucks in good repair, the court was
explicit in stating that its holding was in no way based on that clause in the contract of rental.
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recovery, for he need only prove that the defective condition of the
bailed chattel caused his injury.73
For historical reasons, the modern action for breach of warranty
contains both tort and contract elements.74 The contractual requirement
of privity, which limits the warranty to the parties to the contract, has
caused two distinct types of problems. One is the question of horizontal
privity: Can the injured bystander recover from the bailor on the implied
warranty given to the bailee?75 The other is the question of vertical
privity: Can the bailee sue the manufacturer directly? Although some
courts have allowed buyers to maintain direct actions against the manu-
facturer of defective goods for breach of warranty, 76 normally the waste-
ful procedure of a series of warranty actions is necessary to reach the
manufacturer when he is at fault.77 Even greater problems for the injured
bailee, however, are the requirement of notice78 and disclaimers of liabil-
ity by the bailor .7 These contract elements function as a defense for the
bailor or seller and can prevent recovery by the injured consumer. Al-
though these rules of warranty are efficient and equitable in commercial
settings, they tend to frustrate rational and fair compensation for per-
sonal injury."
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
In 1960, recognizing the problems inherent in the use of implied
warranties in consumer personal injury actions, Dean Prosser advocated
a rule of strict liability for personal injuries caused by consumer goods.
"Id. at 461, 212 A.2d at 784 (dissenting opinion). Justice Hall dissented on this very issue.
He thought that liability should be restricted to defects existing at the time of the rental.
This same rule has been adopted by statute in Louisiana. See Celestin v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 1968), where LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952) is
discussed.
"PROssER § 95, at 634-35; 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 41, § 197. Since implied warranties
arise by operation of law, they are usually viewed as tort in nature, while the elements of privity,
notice and disclaimer are contractual in nature.
715See text following note 155 infra.
"
8See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 50, § 91, at 284; PROSSER § 97, at 653-54.
"Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
799 (1966). Although the Code does not provide for direct actions against the manufacturer,
UCC § 2-607(5) does allow the retailer to "vouch-in" his seller in order to settle common issues
of fact in one action.
7 See text accompanying notes 126-30 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 131-47 infra.
"Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1965)
(Traynor, C.J.).
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He recommended abandoning the rules of contract and the term "war-
ranty" in favor of the "familiar" concept of strict liability in tort.8' In
1963 the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine to manufactur-
ers,82 and since that time over two-thirds of the jurisdictions have
adopted the theory for use against retailers, wholesalers, and manufac-
turers in products liability cases. 8 This judicial trend was given further
impetus in 1965 when the American Law Institute included the doctrine
as section 402A in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts as a
basis of liability for sellers of defective and unreasonably dangerous
goods.84
With some states already holding bailors liable for breach of im-
plied warranty, it was inevitable that courts would extend strict liability
in tort to bailors also. In 1965 the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service," in what is admit-
tedly dictum, approved application of the theory to a bailment for hire.88
Since that time, Califorhia, 7 Hawaii,88 Alaska," and New Mexico"0
have expressly held that strict liability in tort applies to the bailor of
rented chattels as well as to the retail seller and manufacturer." In
$'Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1134 (1960).
9'Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"3PROSSER § 98, at 657-58. For a more detailed listing of cases see Prosser, supra note 77,
at 794-98.
'"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
-45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"Id. at 452, 457, 212 A.2d at 778-79, 781.
nPrice v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); MeClaflin v.
Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
"Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
"Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970).
'
0Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
"Contra, Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd,
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comparing the bailor for hire, or lessor, with the retailer, these courts
have said that they see no substantial distinction between the seller and
the non-seller, such as the bailor for hire, because each places the goods
in the stream of commerce knowing that they will be used without
inspection for defects.12
The courts have been unanimous in restricting application of the
strict liability in tort doctrine to "commercial lessors ' 9 3 or "mass les-
sors. '"" This is in accord with comment f of section 402A, which says
that strict liability in tort is applicable only to sales by those in the
business of supplying goods as opposed to non-commercial, isolated
sales by non-merchants. 5 The rationale for applying strict liability in
tort only to mass sellers and lessors is in part the special responsibility
for the safety of consumers assumed by those who supply products as a
business and the forced reliance of those who purchase. All courts that
have applied the doctrine have placed great importance on the idea that
the merchant represents the chattel as safe for use by placing it in the
stream of commerce and that the consumer uses it in reliance on this
implicit representation.
The main reason for holding the manufacturer and the commercial
seller, as well as the commercial bailor, to this liability is the concept
of "enterprise liability" or risk distribution. Although these terms are
normally treated as describing a unitary concept, they are really sepa-
rate concepts. Enterprise liability is based on the "principle that each
activity is accountable for the distinctive risks it creates" and should
bear the cost of compensating for harm resulting from fruition of that
risk.9 Although "risk distribution" has several meanings, most courts
403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969) (federal court refused to apply
strict liability in tort to a lessor largely because of the wording of § 402A).
"Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970);
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 781 (1965).
"Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970),
94Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 82, 234 A.2d 415, 418-19 (1967).
"
5RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, commentf at 350-51 (1965).
"Id. See also Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970), where the Missouri court added its
own requirement that the "mass lessor" be engaged in a profit-making business organized for
economic gain, in holding that a municipally-owned, non-profit golf course was not a "mass lessor"
of golf carts.
"
7E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 781
(1965); Prosser, supra note 77, at 799.
"Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963).
"Keeton, supra note 5, at 895.
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use it both to recognize economic realities resulting from adoption of
strict liability in tort and to justify imposing the cost of compensating
for injuries on the bailor, retailer, or manufacturer."'0
The retailer who is sued by the injured buyer for injuries caused by
defective goods will rarely have to absorb the ultimate loss, for he will
often have an action against both the wholesaler and the manufacturer.
Although the manufacturer may have to absorb some of the cost of
compensating for injuries, perhaps with liability insurance, the cost will
largely be passed along to the consumer in the form of higher prices."0'
The bailor who purchases defective goods that cause physical injuries
will, like the retailer, have a cause of action against his supplier or the
manufacturer if he is sued. But the bailor who rents chattels with defects
attributable to the use of the goods in his business has no cause of action
against his supplier. Therefore, although many courts have compared
the bailor to the retailer, the liability of the bailor for hire bears closer
resemblance to that of a manufacturer. An understanding of this greater
exposure to liability is essential to analysis of the effect of those cases
imposing strict tort liability on the bailor for hire.
Of the five courts applying strict liability in tort to the bailor, one
holds him responsible for all defects that cause injuries during the course
of the bailment,0 2 three apparently hold him responsible only for inju-
ries caused by defects existing when the goods leave his hands,' and
one limits his responsibility to injuries caused by those defective goods
that were defective when he purchased them.'
When the New Mexico court held that the bailor is subject to strict
liability in tort,"0 5 the court expressly adopted the reasoning of the con-
'mRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c, at 349-50 (1965); Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-01 (1961).
'
0tCalabresi says that three meanings are attributable to "risk distribution": (1) spreading all
losses, as broadly as possible; (2) the "deep pocket" theory, or making those most able to pay bear
the losses; and (3) "enterprise liability." Calabresi, supra note 100, at 499.
Because of these various meanings attributable to risk distribution, it might be better for
courts to use the term "enterprise liability" if that is the reason for imposing liability. One federal
court refused to impose strict liability in a maritime products liability case because it equated strict
liability with the deep pocket theory-that of a giant central insurer who absorbs all losses. See
Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques, 301 F. Supp. 513, 524
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969).
'"Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"'Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466
P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d
240 (1970).
10IStang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
1051d.
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curring opinion in Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery,"6 an Arizona lower
appellate court case. Although the issue on appeal in Lechuga was
whether strict liability would be extended to lessors of chattels, the court
never reached that issue, but disposed of the case on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the standard of proof necessary for
strict liability in tort. 07 However, one judge discussed the issue exten-
sively in a concurring opinion. He concluded that since the doctrine was
designed to reach only "the ultimate culprit, the manufacturer" for a
defect attributable either to design or to manufacture, the lessor should
be strictly liable only for those defects attributable to the manufac-
turer."' The basis for this conclusion was the statement in Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co.""9 that the retailer should be held liable so that he
could act as a conduit through which liability could flow to reach the
manufacturer.' The concurring opinion said that in all other cases the
bailor's duty should be measured by the law of negligence.",
Therefore, in New Mexico, the liability of a lessor of chattels is
measured by different legal doctrines, depending upon when the defect
arose." 2 Regardless of whether this holding reflects a correct interpreta-
tion of Vandermark, this restrictive New Mexico position should not be
followed. The same reasons exist for holding the bailor liable for defects
arising from the use of the goods in his business as exist for holding the
manufacturer liable for the manufacture of defective and unreasonably
dangerous goods. Therefore it is a logical and consistent extension of
the theory to apply it to all defects arising while the product is in the
control either of the manufacturer or of the bailor.
In contrast to the New Mexico application of the doctrine, the
Hawaii case of Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp."3 makes it clear
that the bailor for hire is subject to strict liability for physical injury
caused by all defects in the chattel at the time it left his control. In that
case the court noted that although the bailor could only win on his cross-
claim against the manufacturer if the jury found that the defect was not
caused by any failure on his part to maintain the car properly, his duty
'112 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970).
'"Id. at 36, 467 P.2d at 260.
'"Id. at 38, 467 P.2d at 262 (Jacobson, J., concurring).
1161 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
"id. at 262-63, 319 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
"'See Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970).
"'Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972).
"52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
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for all defects is to be measured by strict liability in tort."' This also
appears to be the way the doctrine has been applied by both the Califor-
nia 115 and the Alaska courts.'
The most far-reaching duty is that envisioned by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service."7
Although the exact holding of the court was that an implied warranty
of fitness continues for the entire rental period,' the court seems to say
that the bailor's liability would extend over the same period of time
under strict liability in tort."9 If the court would indeed apply this
principle to strict liability in tort, and it would seem anomalous if it did
not, this application of the doctrine would be much more extensive than
that of any other state.
Although the New Jersey application of strict liability in tort might
at first appear to place a much greater liability on a bailor than on a
manufacturer, it is entirely consistent with the policy behind strict liabil-
ity. Any physical injury caused by a defect arising while the product is
in the bailee's use, if not caused by improper or abnormal use, is a risk
attributable to the bailor's business. Although the bailor will be liable
for almost all physical injuries caused by defective goods, he is not left
entirely at the mercy of the normal deterioration of his rental goods.
The bailor still has some measure of control over how great a risk he is
willing to take, for he has the ability to withdraw the goods from the
stream of commerce any time he thinks they are approaching the limits
of safe performance,' something neither the retailer nor the manufac-
turer can do. The bailor will simply have to balance the compensation
to be received against the risk that a dangerous defect will arise while
the product is in use. As the age of each rental item increases, its risk
factor, and therefore the cost of liability insurance, increases. When the
cost of insurance becomes high enough to cut the profit margin at the
highest acceptable rental price to zero, the item will be removed from
the bailor's inventory of rental goods. Although this process appears to
be difficult and time-consuming, it is no different from the procedure a
"'Id. at 78-79, 470 P.2d at 245.
"'See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 254-56, 466 P.2d 722, 728-29, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
184-85 (1970).
"16See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970).
11745 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"'Id. at 450, 212 A.2d at 778.
"'Id. at 456, 212 A.2d at 781.
'id. at 455, 212 A.2d at 780.
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manufacturer must undertake to balance the cost of quality control
against the cost of insuring against personal injury liability.121
Just as application of strict liability in tort to the manufacturer
should result in the production of safer products, so should New Jersey's
application to the bailor result in safer goods available for rent.122 Al-
though the bailor who is liable only for defects present when he rents
the chattel will have a similar risk-cost analysis to make, he need not
screen rental items nearly as carefully as the bailor who is liable for all
defects. For one thing, the difficulty of proving that the defect was
present when rented will prevent recovery on some claims. Secondly, in
longer leases the bailor need not worry about defects that might arise
in the future. It is only when the bailor is responsible for all defects that
maximum protection for the safety of the public will be achieved.
While strict liability in tort discards both vertical privity and negli-
gence, the fact that the injury occurred during the term of the bailment
does not prove the bailee's case. The elements of the case are the same
as for breach of warranty. In order to recover against either the bailor
or the manufacturer, the bailee must prove that his injuries were caused
by the defective product and, under the majority rule, that the defect
existed or was inchoate when it left the hands of the defendant.12
Although res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, the plaintiff is permitted
to prove that the defect existed when it left the defendant's control by
circumstantial evidence alone. 1 4 The negligence of the bailor is not an
issue, and evidence establishing his degree of care is not even relevant.12
In short, the bailor is not held liable because his conduct has deviated
from any norm but because public policy demands that he pay for losses
attributable to risks created by his business activities.
DEFENSES OF THE BAILOR
Requirement of Notice. In order to preserve his remedies for
breach of warranty, the buyer of goods must give timely notice of the
121Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on Automobile Accidents and Unsound
Products, 53 VA. L. REv. 899, 908-09 (1967).
12Id.
'"Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 75, 470 P.2d 240, 243 (1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
"'Reader v. General Motors Corp., 107 Ariz. 149, 154-55, 483 P.2d 1388, 1393 (1971) (en
banc); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 76-77, 470 P.2d 240, 244 (1970).
1'Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alas. 1970). The bailee, of course, must show
reasonable use of the chattel.
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breach. 26 The requirement for notice of breach is necessary in commer-
cial transactions between merchants, for it encourages cure of noncon-
forming tender and normal settlement of other minor conflicts through
negotiation. 2 1
Although the same policy reasons for notice are not present in
instances of personal injury caused by defective goods, failure to meet
this requirement has occasionally barred recovery for personal injury on
breach of warranty theory in sales cases. 12 A few courts, realizing that
the reasons for timely notice are not present in the personal-injury
action, have refused to allow use of the notice requirement as a defense
against the claims of injured consumers. 2 1
Because public policy is clearly recognized as the basis of strict
liability in tort, which therefore arises by operation of law and not by
reason of fault, the useless requirement of notice of breach of warranty
is held to be totally inapplicable. 3 Thus, in actions based on negligence
or strict liability in tort, the only "notice" requirements are those inher-
ent in the statute of limitations.
Disclaimers and Indemnity Clauses. Rental agreements fre-
quently contain either disclaimers of warranties or indemnity clauses.
At common law'3' and under the Uniform Commercial Code, implied
warranties, being viewed as a matter of contract, can be excluded by
express language.32 Because bailors are not always aware of the Code
requirements, the bailee may have slightly greater protection in those
states that use the Code to shape the law of bailment. 3 In addition
to this protection, section 2-719(3) operates to prevent the bailor from
limiting the damages available for breach of warranty resulting in per-
sonal injury. When the goods are "consumer goods," a term defined by
12UCC § 2-607.
'
2 1d., Comment 4.
1t2Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 1371, 1374 (1966); see UCC § 2-607, Comment 5.
1'Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 1371, 1376-79 (1966). UCC § 2-607, Comment 4, notes that although
the injured consumer must notify the seller of the breach within a reasonable time, that requirement
is to be construed liberally so as "not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."
'I'Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 900 (1964).
'Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 959, 428 S.W.2d 46, 55 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
132UCC §§ 2-316(2)-(3).
1'E.g., Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 959, 428 S.W.2d 46, 55 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 51
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
the Code, 34 the limitation is deemed "prima facie unconscionable" and
the court can refuse to enforce it.135 As the Official Comments make
clear, however, the bailor can still disclaim all warranties and thus
escape liability.1 36
The ability to disclaim warranties would not be possible under the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. 3 Although there are some early cases
upholding disclaimers, 138 normally where the defect causes personal
injury the disclaimer has been held void as against public policy: the
bailor is not allowed to define the scope of his own responsibility since
that liability is one imposed by operation of law, not by contract."9 It
would appear that in a state using the Uniform Commercial Code to
determine the bailor's duty a similar result could be achieved in some
circumstances by holding the disclaimer unconscionable as a matter of
public policy. " " Since concepts of what is unconscionable vary widely,
however, use of this doctrine would not achieve a result of the same
compass as is achieved by strict liability in tort.
Although the bailor cannot escape strict liability by way of dis-
claimer, apparently he can escape it by means of an indemnity clause. " '
In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 4 2 the California Supreme Court said by way
of dictum that an indemnity clause specifically covering a strict liability
"e"Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes ...." UCC § 9-109.
1-UCC §§ 2-719(3), -302. For a discussion of the meaning of "prima facie" in this provision,
see Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the U.C.C.-How to Succeed in
Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 DENVER L.J. 579, 623 (1969); Note,
Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
564, 598-99 (1964).
1'UCC §§ 2-316, Comment 3, 2-719, Comment 3. But cf Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV., supra
note 135, at 598, where it is asserted that the pressures of competition generally prevent merchants
from withdrawing all warranty protection.
"'Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 900 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m at 355-56 (1965).
"'See Prosser, supra note 77, at 833.
''Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 900 (1964).
"'Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971) (an inconspicuous disclaimer
was held to be unconscionable). See also Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability to Warranties: A Move Toward Strict Liability Within the U.C.C., 38 FORDHAM L.
REV. 73 (1969).
"I .. .do hereby exonerate, indemnify and save harmless the company from all claims and
liabilities to all parties for damage or loss to any person, persons or property in any way arising
out of or during the use of said equipment." Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510, 512, 87
N.W.2d 314, 316 (1958).
"'2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
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in tort claim for defective products would be upheld.' Since that case
involved a commercial lease of equipment and not consumer goods, it
is possible that the court would hold an indemnity clause, particularly
an inconspicuous one in a consumer-directed rental agreement, to be
unconscionable.'44 The indemnity clause is also upheld in both negli-
gence "'45 and implied warranty cases. 4' The reason commonly given is
that the public policy of freedom of contract is best served by enforcing
such provisions. 47 Even in these cases, however, there is the possibility
that a court would accept the argument for unconscionability under
appropriate circumstances.
Contributory Fault. Two of the most common defenses in a negli-
gence action are contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.'
Although the distinction between the two is not vital in a negligence
action against the bailor since both are held to bar recovery, 49 in actions
based on warranty and strict liability in tort the difference is very impor-
tant. Because courts have not always properly distinguished assumption
of the risk from contributory negligence,' some confusion has arisen
in this area of the law. When the bailee has negligently failed to discover
the defect in the product or to guard against the possibility of its exist-
ence, his conduct is not a bar to an action for breach of warranty", or
in strict liability in tort.5 2 On the other hand, when the bailee's conduct
consists in voluntarily proceeding to encounter a known risk created by
the defective goods, his conduct is best described as assumption of
MId. at 256-58, 466 P.2d at 729-31, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 185-87.
"'See UCC § 2-302.
I"Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510, 87 N.W.2d 314 (1958).
"'Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
"
7Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510, 514, 87 N.W.2d 314, 317 (1958). See also Celestin
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968).
"'PROSSER § 65, at 416; Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
.. PROSSER § 68, at 441.
IOSee Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 459, 212 A.2d 769, 782-
83 (1965).
"'Prosser, supra note 77, at 838.
"
2Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 472-73, 251 A.2d 278, 283 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
Sometimes this conduct, even though characterized as contributory negligence by the court,
is held to be irrelevant because of the nature of the cause of action. Id.; Prosser, supra note 77, at
838.
Upon analysis, however, it does not appear that this conduct fails to measure up to the
applicable standard of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965). Since the bailee's recovery in warranty and strict
liability in tort is based on the imputed reasonable reliance on the representation of safety, failure
to inspect for defects should be recognized as simply not negligent under the circumstances.
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risk. 1 3 It is this conduct that bars recovery either in an action for
breach of implied warranty54 or in strict liability in tort. 55
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS
As might be expected, the large majority of cases in which the
bailor for hire has been sued by a third person have involved leases of
automobiles. When the bailor's duty is measured by the standards of
negligence, he will be liable for his negligence to anyone who may
reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of probable use of the
product. 5 ' Thus, those protected under this doctrine include not only
foreseeable guests of the bailee'5 7 but other members of the public as
well."' Injured third persons do not recover because of any obligation
imposed by the contract of bailment itself but because of the general
obligation imposed by law upon individuals to refrain from actions
having foreseeable injurious consequences. 9
Since an action for breach of warranty is normally viewed as a
contract action, only those in privity, (that is, those with whom the
bailor had contractual relations) may recover on the warranty.' Al-
though some courts also allow those third persons who use the chattel
to recover on a common law implied warranty for personal injuries, 6'
those injured bystanders who were not using the chattel have normally
been denied recovery.6 2 In those states which would apply the Uniform
Commercial Code in one manner or another to the bailment for hire,
some injured third persons could possibly recover under section 2-318,
which extends protection to certain third party beneficiaries of the
"5RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965); Prosser, supra note
77, at 839; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1100-03 (1967).
1'5 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 459, 212 A.2d 769, 782-83
(1965); Prosser, supra note 77, at 838-40.
'OBachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Alas. 1970).
'-Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 73 S.E.2d 4 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965); PROSSER § 100.
57Penton v. Favors, 262 Ala. 262, 78 So. 2d 278 (1955); Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266,
189 N.E. 39 (1934).
'
5
'Hudson v. Drive It Yourself, Inc., 236 N.C. 503, 504-05, 73 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1952).
5 Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 201, 22 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1929).
' PROSSER § 93, at 622, § 95, at 635.
'See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 455, 212 A.2d 769, 781
(1965) (employees can recover). But cf. Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117
S.E.2d 21 (1960).
"'Alexander Funeral Home, Inc. v. Pride, 261 N.C. 723, 136 S.E.2d 120 (1964) (absence of
privity prevented owner of building damaged in automobile accident from recovering from the
seller for breach of warranty).
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warranty.1 13 Of the three alternative versions of this section, most states
have adopted the most restrictive one, under which recovery would be
limited to members of the family or household of the bailee and guests
in his home, and then only if "it is reasonable to expect that such
persons may use, consume or be affected by the goods."' 64
Although there are no reported cases in which a bailor has been
held strictly liable in tort for injuries to an "innocent bystander," it is
clear from cases applying strict tort liability to sellers that the pedestrian
hit by the leased automobile should be able to recover from the bailor."5
Recovery is based in these cases not on the representation of safety that
some courts have stressed' but on the public policy to afford maximum
protection for public safety and on the concept of enterprise liability." 7
One early decision stated that "foreseeability or reasonable anticipation
of injury from the defect" is the test of coverage. 66 Although such a test
would be consistent with historical tort doctrines, and would not bar
recovery in many cases, it is not consistent with the enterprise liability
theory, so it would be better simply to allow recovery by all those whose
injuries were caused by any normal use of the defective goods.6 9
Thus, unless the person injured as a result of defective goods is in
privity with the bailor or falls within the exceptions normally applicable
to users, his choice of legal theories is limited to strict liability in tort
and negligence and, therefore, in most jurisdictions to negligence.
m UCC § 2-318.
"'Although Alternatives B and C of UCC § 2-318 extend protection to a much larger class
of beneficiaries, very few states have adopted either. See UCC § 2-318, Comment 3 (1972 Official
Text).
"'Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 83-89, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652, 656-57 (1969). All states adopting strict liability in tort have extended recovery to bystanders
when presented with that issue. Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 190, 463 P.2d 83, 85 (1970)
(listing of cases). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment o at 356-57 (1965)
(Institute expresses no opinion on whether bystanders are covered by this section).
11"See Prosser, supra note 77, at 819-20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment o at 356-57 (1965).
'
8 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 88-89, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652, 656-57 (1969).
'
MMitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, ......._, 214 A.2d 694, 698 (1965). See also Piercefield
v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODuCTs LIABILITY § 16A[4][d] (1970).
in2Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 935 (1964); see
generally R. NORDSTROM, supra note 50, §§ 81-83.
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ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Because there are different legal theories underlying the three doc-
trines of bailor liability, the applicable statutes of limitations begin to
run at different points in time. "'In general a cause or right of action
accrues, so as to start the running of the statute of limitations, as soon
as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises .... ' "170 For a tort
suit based on negligence, both the negligent act or omission and the
resultant injury must have occurred to constitute a cause of action.17,
Therefore, when the bailor's liability is based on negligence, the applica-
ble statute of limitations starts to run when the physical injuries caused
by the defective chattel are sustained.172
A recent amendment to North Carolina's accrual-of-action statute
provides that a cause of action for personal injury accrues when the
injury is discovered or reasonably ought to have been discovered, pro-
vided that the period not exceed ten years after the last act of the
defendant.173 This amendment is not applicable to causes of action
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, however.1 74 Although the
ten-year limit could prevent recovery by a buyer, it seems unlikely that
it will affect the bailee in many instances. A cause of action for breach
of implied warranty accrues when the breach occurs-that is, when
tender of delivery is made-under both the common law rule1 7 and the
Code.176 Knowledge or lack thereof of the defect, and thus of the breach,
on the part of the bailee is immaterial.177 Although the bailee could
possibly not discover the defect until after the statute of limitations had
run, most consumer leases and bailments are short enough that this
should rarely be a problem.178 If courts apply the Code to bailments for
"'Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 325, 128 S.E.2d 413,
415 (1962).
"'Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 311, 1 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1939).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (Supp. 1971) provides a three-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions.
"
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Supp. 1971).
17id.
"'I S. WILLISTON, supra note 41, § 212a.
'
7
"[W]here a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery
of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach
is or should have been discovered." UCC § 2-725(2).
m1Id.
'
7 8Manufacturers' equipment leases, frequently running for periods longer than ten years,
could prove to be the exception.
"'Sinka v. Northern Commercial Co., 491 P.2d 116, 119 (Alas. 1971); Layman v. Keller
Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970) (use UCC statute of limitations for all breach
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hire, they might be expected to use the section 2-725 four-year statute
of limitations,' but this might not be the case. A federal district court,
applying Virginia law, concluded that the state courts would use the
two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, running from the
date of injury, in breach of warranty actions rather than the statute of
limitations in Code section 2-725.11 This same result has also been
reached in the New Jersey state courts.'8'
For tort actions based on strict liability, courts are split on the
questions of which statute of limitations applies and when the cause of
action accrues. There is really only one issue that determines the answer
to both questions: Is a strict liability action an extension of the implied
warranty action, or is it simply a tort action? A New York appeals court
has held that strict tort liability is really only a warranty action extended
to members of the public.2 Therefore the applicable statute of limita-
tions is that for warranty actions and begins to run when the breach
occurs.1 3 Other courts, viewing strict liability in tort as a tort action,
have held that the applicable statute of limitations is that used for
general tort actions. 4 Although not explicitly so held, it would be con-
sistent with this rule for the cause of action to accrue when the injury
occurred or was discovered.
Although the bailee's cause of action is not likely to be barred
before he suffers physical injuries, because the possible causes of action
accrue at different times, close attention must be paid to ensure that the
suit is filed in time to preserve all possible theories of recovery.
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Of the three theories of liability that have been held applicable to
a bailment for hire, which one is the most advantageous for the plaintit?.
Recovery under any of the legal doctrines requires that the plaintiff be
of warranty actions, regardless of whether for personal injury or injury to property); see Gardiner
v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 2d 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
1w0Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971) (based on an earlier Virginia
case dealing with the pre-Code contract statute of limitations).
'
8 Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
'Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1967),
affdmem., 29 App. Div. 2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1968), affd, 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
'1Id. at _ , 291 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
'
8 Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967);
Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970).
[Vol. 51
PROD UCTS LIABILITY
able to show the causal relationship between the defect and his physical
injuries. In negligence, the plaintiff frequently encounters problems in
attempting to show that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed
the defect. Even when the use of res ipsa loquitur is not restricted as it
is in North Carolina, recovery can be denied when the bailor's expert
shows that the defect was not of a type discoverable by reasonable
inspection or when the bailor establishes the use of acceptable inspection
procedures. Discoverability by reasonable inspection is irrelevant under
the other doctrines. The major element of the case in both implied
warranty and strict tort liability-that the defect was present when the
chattel left the bailor's possession-is also implicit in the negligence
action. Although proof is easier in theory since the issue of discoverabil-
ity by reasonable inspection has been eliminated, the plaintiff will ordi-
narily have to rely on circumstantial evidence to be able to prove his
case. "'85 From the standpoint of proof, therefore, strict liability in tort
and implied warranty are both more advantageous measures of liability
for the plaintiff than is negligence.
Proof of the breach of duty, no matter how that duty is defined, is
not the only relevant consideration. As noted earlier,'86 the bailor has
defenses to prevent recovery. In a negligence action, the bailor can avoid
liability if the bailee has been contributorily negligent. Although this
defense is not available if the bailee is able to sue for breach of an
implied warranty of quality, failure to give timely notice and the pres-
ence of a disclaimer of warranties in the rental agreement can prevent
recovery.
The bailee who is fortunate enough to have a strict tort liability
action is not subject to the contributory negligence defense, to the re-
quirement of timely notice or, most importantly, to disclaimers of liabil-
ity. For the bailee, the public policy of invalidating disclaimers makes
strict liability much more advantageous than even an action for breach
of implied warranties. For the injured bystander, strict liability in tort
presents the greatest chance of recovery not only because of ease of
proof but also because of abolition of the privity requirement. It is not
surprising that strict liability in tort offers the injured plaintiff the most
advantages. It is a modern theory of liability designed to give the con-
sumer with physical injuries caused by defective products the maximum
"'See text following note 123 supra.
'See text accompanying notes 126-55 supra.
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opportunity for recovery. It has the advantages of negligence and im-
plied warranty actions with none of the disadvantages.
Strict liability in tort may offer the greatest opportunity for recov-
ery, but it is not always available even in those states that recognize the
doctrine. Only bailors who are in the business of supplying chattels for
a consideration are subject to this theory of liability."7 And in addition,
in one state, strict liability in tort applies only to those defects present
when the goods are purchased rather than when they are rented, a
limitation that has the frequent effect of restricting the bailee to the law
of negligence. 88 This application of strict liability, although similar to
its use in retail sales, is really a rejection of the doctrine as applied to
bailors. A large number of defects in bailment chattels will be attributa-
ble directly to their use in the business, not to their manufacture. Under
the majority rule, however, even these defects are covered.
Even though strict liability in tort facilitates recovery for physical
injury and is therefore the most advantageous theory for plaintiffs, the
more important question is under what circumstances should the loss
of those injured by defective goods be shifted to the bailor? Which
theory of liability offers society the most advantages?
Professor Keeton, comparing negligence and strict liability, has
noted that the best justification for using the negligence principle is its
social acceptance as a fair and just system of liability.' A system of
strict liability based on the enterprise entity theory, on the other hand,
can be justified on grounds of fairness and the economic incentive it
provides to increase the safety of products. 90 It seems fair to ascribe the
loss to a business activity when harm to another can be identified with
a risk created by that activity, whether created negligently or not. Not
only are all losses attributable to the bailor's business shifted to the
business, but the increased duty of responsibility should encourage the
bailor to pay closer attention to the condition of.his rental items by
reducing the economic incentives to rent chattels approaching the end
of their useful lives.'9' The bailor may suffer a slight decrease in revenues
under this form of liability, but he can largely pass the cost along in
increased rental prices. 192 Thus the rental price itself will include an
"'See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
IStang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
'Keeton, supra note 5, at 887.
"'Id. at 895.
"See Morris, supra note 121, at 909.
"'Higher prices may decrease the volume of business, and encourage purchase of some items,
but may be only marginally important.
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insurance component. Although one may question whether the bailee
should bear the cost of protection for the innocent bystander, the con-
clusion is inescapable that initially at least part of this cost will be passed
along to the consumer-bailee. However, if the increase in the rental price
of consumer goods causes a decrease in the volume of rentals, this cost
may well be one the bailor will absorb as he lowers prices to regain lost
business. The end result for society will be safer products available for
rent or sale and increased financial resources available to a greater
number of accident victims. In exchange, the rental prices for chattels
will be increased.
Although North Carolina has not yet joined those states recogniz-
ing strict liability in tort for products liability cases, there has been some
indication that the court might accept the theory if squarely presented.
In Corprew v. Chemical Corp.193 the North Carolina Supreme Court
abandoned the privity requirement in negligence actions against the
manufacturer of defective products. The language used by the court is
especially interesting, for it could easily have come from a case holding
the manufacturer subject to strict liability in tort.
By placing its goods upon the market, the manufacturer represents to
the public that they are suitable and safe for use. . . . The manufac-
turer has invited and solicited the use of its product, and when it leads
to disaster it should not be permitted to avoid the responsibility by
saying that it made no contract with the consumer. The manufacturer
should be held liable because it is in a position to insure against liability
and add the cost to the product.9 '
Although the theory of liability discussed in this passage is negligence,
the court clearly indicated that it accepts the enterprise entity theory,
the usual basis for imposing strict liability in tort.
Nonetheless, even if North Carolina were to adopt strict liability
in tort for use in bailment for hire cases, the bailee's chances for recov-
ery might not be substantially increased in all cases. In several North
Carolina bailment cases decided under the negligence theory of liability,
the plaintiff has not been able to prove his case because of a restrictive
application of res ipsa loquitur 9 5 The court has been unwilling to infer
IP3271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
11id. at 491, 157 S.E.2d at 102 (emphasis added). Compare id. with Prosser, supra note 77,
at 799, and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
"
5See text following note 24 supra.
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from the brief time a leased car had been in the hands of the bailee tha
the defect had been present when the car left the bailor's possession."9
The inferences at the core of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are the same
as those permitting use of circumstantial evidence in strict liability ac.
tions. 197 If the North Carolina court should restrict the use of circum.
stantial evidence in strict liability cases as they have restricted use o
res ipsa loquitur in negligence actions, adoption of strict liability in tor
would mean only that when the plaintiff needs circumstantial evidence
to prove his case, he would lose in strict liability rather than in negli.
gence. In this manner the substantive duty imposed by strict liability ir
tort might be rewritten by the restrictive proof requirements much a.
the substantive duty of the bailor in negligence actions has been rewrit.
ten."'8 The bailor in effect would be liable only for those defects th
plaintiff could prove the bailor has knowledge of or could prove th(
existence of by expert testimony. There is some evidence, however, tc
indicate that the North Carolina Supreme Court might be willing to re-
examine prior decisions that unduly restrict the use of res ipsa loquitw
and to change its approach to the use of circumstantial evidence ir
general. 9 ' Even with the restricted position of circumstantial evidence
the plaintiff-bailee would still have a greater chance of recovery thar
under negligence. The bailor would be precluded from escaping liabilit3
by showing care on his part in inspection of the chattel, or by use ol
any of the defenses barred by strict liability.
Strict liability in tort has been widely and often enthusiasticall)
adopted for use in products liability cases. This theory of liability ap.
pears to be the most advantageous liability system for our moderr
economy. It should be applied to the bailor for hire as well as to the
manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. Specifically, the best approacl
seems to be that taken by the New Jersey courts."' Although holding
the bailor responsible for all defects arising during the course of the
bailment is alien to the historical measures of liability, it is a logical
application of the enterprise entity theory of liability and should provide
the greatest impetus toward keeping unsafe- products out of the stream
of commerce.
MARVIN ALLEN BETHUNE
"'See text following n ota 30 supra.
"'Prosser, supra note 77, at 841.
"sSee text following note 26 supra.
"'Byrd, supra note 25, at 478-80.
10See text following note 116 supra.
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